so RJE first, yes as written it did require that chown() work as non-root,
as it ran as the "rje" euid and did chown() files to the user's uid, I do
not believe that was the cause of the chown() semantics change, just a use
of it. iOne could do the same thing by other means (run as root, have a
setuid 0, file owner changer, etc) if chown(2) was root only. Why did I
believe that?
in section V.
(iv) Make changes to the UNIX system only after much delibera-
tion, and only when major gains can be made. Avoid chang-
ing the UNIX system's interfaces, and isolate any such changes
as much as possible. Stay close to the Research UNIX system,
in order to take advantage of continuing improvements.
OK now lets look at a passage from VI --
A good many UNIX (as opposed to PWB/UNIX) systems are run
as "friendly-user" systems, and are each used by a fairly small
number of people who often work closely together. A large frac-
tion of these users have read/write permissions for most (or all)
of the files on the system, have permission to add commands to
the public directories, are capable of "re-booting" the operating
system, and even know how to repair damaged file systems.
The PWB/UNIX system, on the other hand, is most often found
in a computer-center environment.
So the old way, no one even really needs chown() everybody had access to
everything.
then 8.1
The first major set of reliability improvements concerned the
handling of disk files. It is a fact of life that time-sharing sys-
tems are continually short of disk space;
...
long-term tape backup copies, on the other hand, offer users the
chance to delete files that they might want back at some time in
the future, without requiring them to make "personal" copies
disk is always full, and users are discourged from making multiple copies
of f and even encourge to remove stuff you do not need right now and get
it from backup later, let alone making copies of someone else's files.
next from 8.4, while its abouttrying to solve the uid shortage
(only 256 at the time) it shows you the users' mind set, groups tended to
functionally operate as single user, but everyone still wanted a unique id.
.... depended heavily on the
characteristics of the PWB/UNIX user community, which, as mentioned
above, consists mostly of groups of cooperating users,
rather than of individual users working in isolation from one
another. Typical behavior and opinions in these groups were:
(i) Users in such a group cared very little about how much
protection they had from each other, as long as their files
were protected from damage by users outside their group.
(ii) A common password was often used by members of a
group, even when they owned distinct user-IDs. This was
often done so that a needed file could be accessed without
delay when its owner was unavailable.
(iii) Most users were willing to have only one or two
user-IDs per group, but wanted to retain their own login names
and login directories. We also favored such a distinction, because
experience showed that the use of a single login name by
more than a few users almost always produced cluttered
directory structures containing useless files.
so the group members would know each othesr passwords (but there were many
groups on the same machine) thus non-root chown() become self-service in
sharing of files between group members, without the need of system
administrator involvment. while one could give their files to someone
outside the group, it is not productive.
And then --
to improve the security of files, a few commands were
changed to create files with read/write permission for their own-
ers, but read-only for everyone else. The net effect of these
changes was to greatly enlarge the size of the user community
that could be served, without destroying the convenience of the
UNIX system and without requiring widespread and fundamental
changes
shows the need to lock down file access, which means if you are sharing
in Research UNIX you did not need to chown() files, you could
just write them, but PWB will lock it down so a different group cannot
muck with it.
Now you are going to say this could all be done with proper use of group ids
and group permissions. I agree, but in practice it was not done, as PWB
even consdidered the complete removal of gids, but only decided against it
as they would have to change too much software --
considered was that of
decreasing the available number of the so-called "group-IDs," or
removing them entirely, and using the bits thus freed to increase
the number of distinct user-IDs. Although attractive in many
ways, this solution required a change in the interpretation of
information stored with every single disk file (and every backup
copy thereof), changes to large numbers of commands, and a fun-
damental departure from the Research UNIX system during a time
when thought was being given to possible changes to that
system's protection mechanisms. For these reasons, this solution
was deemed unwise.
From: Clem Cole <clemc(a)ccc.com>
Brian - I know the paper and Mash - the 3rd author and lived the times ;-)
I just don't see how having the ability to give away a file to some one
else made it easier for anyone - system programmer or admin. The idea of
giving a device back begs the question of how did you get ownership in the
first place.
The one thing I could think of was something like the RJE system that you
would wanted to have made your files be owned by the RJE system, have them
send it to the mainframe, get back information and then give the results
back to you. If they wanted to do that subsystem with out a root style
privilege, you would need some way to give files away.
But I can think of other ways to do that without needing the chown(2) call
to work with that semantic, so I really don't understand what it was used.
To me, it does not seem to be worth much. As I said have to ask Mash if
he remembers why it was considered a good idea.
Clem