On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 8:40 AM Grant Taylor via TUHS <tuhs(a)minnie.tuhs.org>
wrote:
On 11/05/2018 03:34 PM, Dan Cross wrote:
You can use a modified `login` that will validate
you against a KDC.
ACK
These days the modification generally consists of pam_krb5 added to the
system's PAM configuration.
Modifications
have been made to e.g. SSH so that one can authenticate an
SSH session via GSSAPI, which usually wraps Kerberos. If I recall,
GSSAPI might be one of the lasting legacies of the DCE, though I may be
misremembering history.
*nod*
And similarly – in other protocols (IMAP, SMTP, IRC, the same LDAP) one can
authenticate a session via SASL, which usually wraps GSSAPI, which usually
wraps Kerberos.
Kerberos solves the authentication problem, but does
not provide a
directory service nor does it solve the
authorization problem (though
some "kerberized" services could use a library to consult a
user-provided file of ACLs mapping principals to privileges). On Unix,
"authorization data" includes things like your UID and the set of groups
you belong to (or more precisely, your process's UIDs and GIDs/groups).
Kerberos provided support for privacy via encryption libraries, and it
provided support for integrity via hashing/checksumming/signature
libraries. "Kerberized" versions of network services such as telnet,
FTP, rsh/rlogin/rcp etc all provided support for authentication via the
baseline Kerberos protocol as well as privacy and integrity via
connection-level encryption and checksumming.
I was not aware that Kerberos could provide privacy (encryption) for
kerberized services. I (naively) thought that Kerberos was
authentication that other things could use to make access control
decisions.
You're right, it's primarily an authentication protocol. But due to the way
it works, it *also* negotiates a 'session key' between the user and the
service, which then may be used for transport encryption (sealing). It's
not commonly used as far as I know – most new protocols already have their
own security layers such as TLS or SSH.
Actually LDAP is the only still-widespread protocol that comes to mind
whose implementations frequently make use of Kerberos-based encryption (via
GSSAPI). This is especially common in Active Directory environments, where
the DCs might not have a valid TLS certificate.
(I seem to recall kerberized Telnet didn't survive because it was limited
to DES/3DES for an odd reason. Didn't quite understand why that was the
case, though.)
--
Mantas Mikulėnas