6 Aug
2019
6 Aug
'19
3:55 p.m.
jason-tuhs(a)shalott.net wrote:
I'm guessing by this you files like /dev/fd/42.
A related
problem is the inherent race condition:
If you do
ln -s /bin/setuidscript .
./setuidscript
./setuidscript is opened twice: once when the kernel
reads it and finds #! as magic number and execs the
interpreter, a second time when the interpreter opens
./setuidscript. If you meanwhile run something that
swoops in in the background and replaces ./setuidscript
with malicious instructions for the interpreter, you
win.
This was always described to me as the canonical reason why setuid
interpreted scripts were a security hole, irrespective of any specifics
in the shell or other interpreter.
However, there's a workaround: use fdescfs. fdescfs allows the kernel to
open the script, and then pass the fdescfs path for the (already open)
descriptor to the interpreter as the command to run. According to
https://www.in-ulm.de/~mascheck/various/shebang/#setuid, this
is supported by many systems, including Solaris, several BSDs, and OSX
(with a sysctl).
There's a historical disconnect here. Setuid scripts were disabled in
the mid- to late 80s. /dev/fd didn't hit the commercial Unix world
until SVR4 in 1989, and didn't get into the other systems you mention
until even later.
So yes, that might have worked, but the solution came along too late.
Arnold