On 11/06/2018 12:07 AM, Mantas Mikulėnas wrote:
These days the modification generally consists of
pam_krb5 added to the
system's PAM configuration.
Hum.... I need to do some reading on that.
And similarly – in other protocols (IMAP, SMTP, IRC,
the same LDAP) one
can authenticate a session via SASL, which usually wraps GSSAPI, which
usually wraps Kerberos.
*nod*
Complicating things is that implementations can choose to bypass SASL
and do the GSSAPI interaction directly. Or take things even further and
do the Kerberos interaction directly.
Yet another reason why all these things are complicated. So many
choices that impact other choices in the same problem domain.
You're right, it's primarily an
authentication protocol.
:-)
But due to the way it works, it *also* negotiates a
'session key' between
the user and the service, which then may be used for transport encryption
(sealing).
Does that mean that the protocols would need to retain the session key
and use it for their other non-Kerberos specific protocols? I.e. the
rsh daemon would need to use the session key to encrypt / decrypt the
rsh data, after and independent of the Kerberos authentication process.
It's not commonly used as far as I know – most
new protocols already
have their own security layers such as TLS or SSH.
ACK
I worry that other encryption protocols / methods have far surpassed
Kerberos' encryption capability / strength.
Actually LDAP is the only still-widespread protocol
that comes to mind
whose implementations frequently make use of Kerberos-based encryption
(via GSSAPI).
O.o‽
This sounds like it would be independent of LDAP over SSL (TCP 636).
Would this Kerberos specified encryption be run over the standard LDAP
port (TCP 389)?
This is especially common in Active Directory
environments, where the
DCs might not have a valid TLS certificate.
O.o‽
I'm going to have to go pick my AD guru's brain after reading that.
(I seem to recall kerberized Telnet didn't
survive because it was
limited to DES/3DES for an odd reason. Didn't quite understand why that
was the case, though.)
#questionsQuestions
--
Grant. . . .
unix || die