why his actions were harmless." No doubt such defenders would squirm, if
they existed. But none of the people or organizations Dorn quotes has
ever claimed that his actions were harmless. This too was never an issue
in the Morris case.
Dorn makes much of the fact that Morris received only "a trivial fine
and community service." But the focus both in the trial and in its appeal
was never on the severity of Morris's sentence, but on whether the law
distinguished between malicious computer vandalism and accidental
damaged caused by an intrusion. EFF's position has been that the law should be
construed to make such a distinction.
Dorn writes that "To say that those who intrude and do no lasting damage
are harmless is to pervert what Congress and those who drafted the
legislation sought to do: penalize hackers." Indeed, this would be a
perversion, if anyone were making that argument. Unfortunately, Dorn
seems unwilling to see the arguments that were made. "It is
sickening," writes Dorn, "to hear sobbing voices from the ACLU, the
gnashing of teeth from Mitch Kapor's Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF), and caterwauling from the Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility--all out of step with the industry. They seem so
frightened that the law may reach them that they elected to defend
Morris's indefensible actions." Dorn's distortions here verge on libel,
since we neither defend Morris's actions nor are motivated out of fear
that the law will apply to us. Instead, we are concerned, as all
citizens should be, that the law make appropriate distinctions between
intentional and unintentional harms in the computer arena, just as it
does in all other realms of human endeavor.
A more glaring factual error occurs one paragraph later, when he writes
that "The Supreme Court says intruders can be convicted under the law
because by definition an intrusion shows an intent to do harm. That
takes care of Morris." The Supreme Court has never said any such thing--after
all, the Court declined to hear the case. Even the lower courts in the
Morris case made no such claim.
What is far more "sickening" than even Dorn's imaginary versions of our
concerns about the Morris case is his irresponsibility in making
unsubstantiated charges that even a cursory familiarity with the facts
could have prevented. In the course of his article, Dorn manages to get
one thing right--he writes that "The law is not perfect--it needs
clarification and reworking." This has been our position all along, and
it is the basis for our support of Morris's appeal. It is also public
knowledge--Dorn could have found out our position if he had bothered to
ask us.
Mike Godwin
Staff Counsel
EFF